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Access to off-shore markets, technology, and ideas are important to greater productivity 
and higher living standards in New Zealand. Global connectedness requires deep and rich 
links with other countries. However, as a small country, we only have the resources to 
focus on a handful of countries. Are there a key set of countries with which New Zealand 
should be seeking to form deeper bilateral economic relationships? 
This paper reviews the benefits from deeper external bilateral economic engagements 
using the insights from the new literature on economic growth, which places great 
importance on trade, international integration, human capital, and local and cross-border 
knowledge spillovers from research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). This paper will then use insights from the new literature on economic growth to 
develop criteria for selecting countries as partners for deeper bilateral economic linkages 
across six global connectedness dimensions: FDI, R&D links, trade in goods, inbound 
tourism, education exports, and people linkages.  
To account for the growing role of a number of economies in global trade, the partner 
selection criteria will identify two groupings of target countries. The first grouping is focus 
countries: those countries that are of immediate interest for deeper bilateral linkages. The 
second country grouping is horizon countries: countries that are likely to grow in their 
importance to New Zealand over the next 10 to 20 years. 
The key message of this paper is a greater bilateral economic focus by New Zealand on 
the major economies along the Asia-Pacific Rim (and the UK). When external initiatives 
come before decision-makers, they should be seen through a lens that places greater 
confidence in proposals for deeper relationships with the Asia-Pacific Rim countries (or 
the UK), and greater scrutiny of proposals that emphasise other regions and countries.  
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This paper addresses the question of whether there are a key set of countries that New 
Zealand should be seeking to form deeper relationships with.  
The country selection criteria will build on the distinction between global connectedness 
and openness. Openness is the absence of barriers, both here and abroad, to the 
international flow of factors of production. Global connectedness requires deeper and 
richer links with other countries than is implied by openness. Global connectedness can 
be defined as the actual flows of factors of production (such as goods, services, capital, 
people, knowledge, ideas and technology) between countries. 
As a small country, New Zealand only has the resources to focus on a handful of 
countries. Additionally, it is important that external economic strategy consider the full 
range of levers that affect these relationships, such as immigration policy, export 
promotion, security links, regulatory policy, and foreign policy. Access to off-shore 
technology and ideas are likely to be a key element in improving New Zealand￿s 
productivity performance. Greater global connectedness allows us to take advantage of 
and participate in the larger international market and the latest technology and ideas. 
Identifying the countries that New Zealand should focus on for deeper linkages will 
contribute to Treasury and Government thinking on priorities for budget and other 
initiatives. In each budget round, there are bids that are directed at increasing the levels of 
engagement with other countries. This paper will help develop thinking on which countries 
are the most important to New Zealand from an economic perspective and therefore help 
prioritise the different requests for funding. Also, this project will act as an input into 
discussions with other agencies on trade and other external linkages. 
The plan of the paper is that section 2 will discuss the link between economic growth and 
global connectedness. Section 3 will discuss why country selection criteria are needed.  
Section 4 will develop the selection criteria and section 5 will apply them. Section 6 
provides a summary of the paper and identifies next steps for the use of the criteria.  
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2  Economic growth and global connectedness 
2.1  The old and new theories of economic growth 
There is growing acceptance that openness to international exchanges contributes to a 
country￿s economic performance. Yet the mechanisms by which trade and other 
international exchanges promotes long-run growth have been less often articulated.  
The traditional theory of growth dating from Solow (1956, 1957) emphasised labour and 
capital accumulation and technical progress as the drivers of long-run growth.  The central 
importance of technological progress was accepted but not explained by Solow.  The 
conclusion of Solow￿s theory was that long-run real economic growth did not depend 
strongly on economic policy.  Most of long-run economic growth was determined by extra-
economic factors: the general progress of science and technology.  
The new theories of economic growth, usually associated with the writings of Romer 
(1986, 1990, 1994), Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991a, 1991b), Lucas (1988, 1993, 2002), 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1994), suggest that international economic 
integration, human capital, learning by doing, intentional industrial innovation, and local 
and cross-border spillovers from innovation are all important to the growth process.  The 
new theories of growth provide many new ways to think about growth and a more diverse 
set of mechanisms for analysing the role of government policy in raising living standards.   
Romer and others analysed technological change as part of an economy, not outside it as 
Solow had done.  Both new and old theories of growth accept as fundamental that most 
increases in productivity and in living standards come from advances in knowledge, and in 
improvements in the application of knowledge.  However, the new growth theories 
suggest that pro-growth policies can nurture and anti-growth policies can stifle long-run 
growth.  The implication was that economic variables that could be accessible to policy 
manipulation, such as interest and tax rates, as well as subsidies for research and 
technical education, may influence the rate of innovation and the rate of economic growth.  
The incentives for innovation are important in the new growth theories.  Economic growth 
arrives in the form of a greater variety of products and as improvements in existing 
products.  A major part of technological progress requires, at some stage, an intentional 
investment of resources by entrepreneurs (Grossman and Helpman 1991, 1994).  The 
process of finding new technologies is a process in which no discovery is guaranteed, but 
the return to new technologies has to be such that firms have an incentive to invest in the 
process.  R&D buys a chance of discovering the next generation of a targeted product.   
A highly educated labour force is a key input into R&D.  Human capital is vital to 
producing the new ideas that sustain growth. Worker productivity depends on the 
aggregate skill level of all workers.  Societies with more skilled workers￿a high stock of 
human capital￿should generate more ideas and grow faster (Lucas 2002, Romer 1990).  
A sufficient level of human capital is a prerequisite to imitation and adaptation by 
technological followers both at home and abroad (Caselli and Coleman 2001, Caselli and 
Wilson 2003 and Benhabib and Spiegel forthcoming) and to the innovation that creates 
the new technologies in the first place (Romer 1990, Lucas 2002).   
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2.2  Technology transfer and technology spillovers 
The diffusion of new technologies is a lengthy process and many firms continue to invest 
in the older technologies.  Each firm must weigh the benefits of adoption now versus 
adoption later.  Adoption of a new technology can imply the scrapping of existing 
equipment and human capital and retraining.  As the costs or benefits of adoption change, 
the number of adopters changes.  Technology transfer is the cumulative result of a series 
of individual calculations that weigh the incremental benefits of adopting a new technology 
against the costs of change, often in an environment of uncertainty as to the future 
evolution of the technology and its benefits and by limited information about the benefits 
and costs and even about the very existence of the technology.   
New products and processes must be adapted to fit each national market.  There are 
costs involved in exchanging designs and providing training.  There are three types of 
technology transfer.  The first is material transfer, which is the simple import of materials 
(e.g., seeds, machines) and local adoption is not attempted.  The second is design 
transfer, which is in the form of blueprints, handbooks, and formulas.  The foreign 
equipment may be imported to be reverse engineered, so that local engineers can learn 
about the technology.  The third is capacity transfer: the transfer of scientific knowledge 
and technical capability.  This often requires strengthening of education and technical 
capacity.  Firms are better able to adopt complex innovations if they can do R&D to adapt 
the technology to local conditions.  The second and third forms of technology transfer are 
more likely to call for significant pre-existing human capital and then learning by doing.  
Technology diffusion or transfer can come in the form of an arm￿s length transaction. 
When a technology is transferred in this way, the price is attempting to capture the full 
value of the innovation.  However, if the cost of obtaining technological knowledge is less 
than the cost of its invention, including R&D costs, a spillover has occurred.  
Spillovers can occur at the time of purchase despite price premiums due to intellectual 
property rights.  Spillovers may result from importing intermediate and capital goods 
because the product improvements from the supplier￿s R&D efforts are often not fully 
absorbed in its price.  This inability to embody fully the higher quality into prices arises 
from competitive pressures common in innovating industries.  Competition from the ever 
expanding variety of inputs and displacement by a succession of product improvements 
by other firms means that the price premium on each innovation is often short and less 
than the full value of the technical breakthrough.  Other firms take advantage of the new 
technical knowledge, eliminating the innovative firm’s monopoly profits by producing 
goods that are similar or more advanced (Grossman and Helpman 1991). 
Spillovers most commonly occur slowly across time because as firms develop new 
technologies, they can make discoveries that can be applied by others, at no extra cost.  
In addition, when innovators bring out new generations of similar products, they have 
begun where their predecessors finished, building on their insights and work.  Romer 
(1990) contends that any technical knowledge discovered by a firm (and embodied in its 
products) will eventually benefit other firms, even those not engaged in R&D.  Lucas 
(2002) observed that with growth driven by new ideas, much of the return from an idea, 
and virtually all of it for a really important idea, accrues to people other than the originator.   
The new growth theories propose that innovation feeds on and adds to the cumulative 
stock of national and often global knowledge.  R&D contributes to the stock of knowledge, 
which enhances the productivity of an economy, stimulating its growth and, importantly, it 
may generate spillovers that enhance the productivity of other nations.  
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2.3  Trade and technology transfer 
Countries trade with one another, communicate with one another and learn from one 
another more than ever before.  New Zealand can raise its productivity by learning from 
new products and ideas from abroad. A country that is integrated into world markets is 
likely to enjoy access to a larger knowledge base than those living in isolation.   
There are a number of ways in which trade contributes to economic growth. Trade 
expands the stock of knowledge available to those engaging in R&D in New Zealand by 
exposing them to more goods produced using the latest designs which can be imitated 
and developed further. Trade spurs growth because a firm that invents a new product will 
have access to a larger market. Trade prevents duplication in research￿the fixed costs of 
R&D needed to develop new designs need only be incurred once when results are fully 
disseminated. Economic integration means that the fixed costs of R&D can be recovered 
over larger markets.  Trade provides channels of communication that stimulate cross-
border learning, copying and adaptation of production methods and product designs.  
The new growth theories suggest that external linkages that strengthen the cross-border 
flow of new technology and knowledge may increase New Zealand￿s growth rate.  Our 
links with Australia are an example that could be used to deepen relationships with other 
countries. The policies that led to close economic relationships with Australia included 
free trade, free movement of people, and now regulatory harmonisation.  
2.4  Knowledge capital and human capital 
Understanding the policy challenge presented by technology diffusion from the global 
frontier to New Zealand requires an assessment of the extent that the diffusion is in the 
form of knowledge capital or human capital. The new growth theory divides into two 
strands of thought with different messages about technological progress and diffusion.  
The first strand, which is associated with Romer (1986, 1990), has as its focus investment 
in R&D. Technological advances come in the form of new knowledge capital. There is a 
research sector in the economy which produces blueprints for new products and 
processes. The policy suggestion is that investing in more R&D may yield large social 
returns. A second strand of the new growth theories, most commonly associated with 
Lucas (1988, 1993, 2002) suspects that the relationship between technological 
improvement and economic growth is more indirect (see DeLong forthcoming).  
For Lucas, the main advances in knowledge are not generated by processes that are 
rather unembedded in the rest of the economy.  Human capital will increase as a by-
product or bonus from learning how to utilise new types and new generations of capital 
equipment. Learning-by-doing is the knowledge that is the by-product of the experience 
gained in the production of goods.  New human capital arises as a bonus from figuring out 
how to implement new capital goods, figuring out how the production process needs to be 
reorganised, and figuring out how the new capital goods need to be re-designed.  The 
productivity of workers with a given amount of human capital depends upon the human 
capital of the workers that they interact with.  It is reasonable to think workers’ skills are 
augmented through learning, and that workers learn from those around them.  Thus, 
moving a worker from a group where the average level of human capital is low to one 
where the average level is high will raise her productivity.  More highly skilled workers are 
likely to learn new technologies faster than less skilled workers.  Still further bonus 
increases in productivity have to come with the increases in human capital from on-the-job  
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training: the best way to become skilled and productive at handling modern technologies 
is to work at applying them and these improvements in workers’ skills and capabilities are 
major social benefits.  For Lucas (1993, 2002), the increased human capital resulting from 
learning by doing is a strong driver of economic growth.  
The implication for New Zealand of the two strands of the new growth theory is about 
ease in availability of new knowledge.  The differences between Lucas and Romer are 
about the existence of a single global pool of knowledge which New Zealand can draw on. 
New technology that is transmitted widely (such as through new blueprints) is a force 
towards convergence.  The technological isolation implied by human capital being vested 
in specific individuals and groups favours divergence in national growth experiences. 
If technological progress is in the form of new knowledge capital, the associate blueprints 
for new products or processes should be globally available on commercial terms and may 
diffuse quickly to New Zealand.  If the growth of knowledge is through the research 
sectors of the global leaders producing more and more knowledge capital, openness 
allows the importing of those new blueprints to New Zealand at the world price.  
If a significant part of technological progress is often indirect through learning by doing, 
technology diffusion may be indirect and may require the repeating of the learning by 
doing in New Zealand.  This is why global connectedness differs in important respects 
from openness.  If learning by doing is important, openness is not enough to maximise 
growth.  New Zealand may need to connect directly to the individuals and firms that best 
allow the learning by doing and human capital accumulation to be quickly repeated.  
Taking Lucas and Romer together, there may be two sources of new knowledge.  There is 
a global pool of knowledge capital whose blueprints may diffuse quickly from the World￿s 
technological frontier to New Zealand.  The human capital that is the by-product of 
learning by doing may not diffuse as rapidly because it is invested in specific individuals 
and groups.  Access to this form of knowledge requires face-to-face contact and linkages. 
2.5  Active and passive technology transfer 
Two basic mechanisms for technology diffusion or transfer have been emphasised: active 
diffusion through direct learning about and applying of foreign knowledge; and passive 
diffusion by employing specialised and advanced intermediate products invented abroad 
(Keller 2001). If the cost of obtaining technological knowledge by active or passive means 
is less than the cost of its invention, including R&D costs, a spillover has occurred.  
Employing specialised and advanced intermediate products and equipment that have 
been invented abroad is passive diffusion. For passive diffusion to happen, a purchase 
must occur, which is an arm￿s length transaction.  New technology is embodied in the 
product that is being used. Its use should make domestic production more efficient. In 
principle, no new knowledge is passed on to domestic inventors, and the productivity of 
the domestic R&D sector does not increase. When the technology transfer is via an arm￿s 
length transaction, the price is attempting to capture the full value of the innovation. 
However, spillovers are still possible because competition from the ever expanding variety 
of inputs and displacement by the product improvements made by others means that the 
price premium is often short and less than the full value of the innovation. Other firms will 
take advantage of the new technical knowledge, eliminating the innovating firm’s profits by 
producing goods that are similar or more advanced (Grossman and Helpman 1991).   
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Openness is important to passive technology transfer because barriers to trade in new 
intermediate products and capital equipment should restrict productivity in technology 
importing countries.  Eaton and Kortum (2001) attribute 25% of cross-country productivity 
differences to variation in the relative price of capital equipment, about half of which could 
be ascribed to barriers to trade in equipment (see also Jones 1994). 
The most common form of active diffusion is direct learning about foreign technological 
knowledge.  This means learning about the blueprint of the new technology so that the 
recipient country can reproduce the technology.  If the cost of obtaining this knowledge is 
less than the cost of invention, a spillover has occurred. Such spillovers should increase 
the productivity of domestic inventive activity.  It becomes part of the domestic knowledge 
stock off which local inventors build.  No purchase is necessary for active spillovers.  They 
can be transferred via product blueprints.  Such transfer can be low-cost.  However, 
without licensing agreements, the inventor may choose to keep the blueprints secret. 
Active technology diffusion or transfer does not always require access to the new 
product￿s blueprints.  There are many other channels of active technology diffusion: 
demonstration effects (which can lead to reverse engineering); personal instruction; 
provision of expert services; hiring workers away from the innovating firm; conferences; 
face-to-face contact; scientific journals; libraries and the Internet; and patents.  
The active forms of diffusion may be more spillover intensive because, apart from patent 
licensing, the diffusion is often through observation and imitation rather than after a 
payment for a good, service or intellectual property licence.  The policy challenge for New 
Zealand may be that it needs to connect better to these more active (and perhaps more 
spillover intensive) channels of technology diffusion.  There may be information and 
institutional gaps to be narrowed, and loose on-the-job human capital to be captured.  The 
necessary off-shore contacts are required for direct learning and imitation and New 
Zealand￿based human capital is required to absorb and adapt the new technology.  Trade 
can provide the elements of a new technology, but other elements must be in place 
domestically for technology transfer to be successful: production capabilities; investment 
capabilities￿the ability to expand production facilities and build new ones; and absorption 
capabilities￿the ability in New Zealand to learn how to use the new technology and then 
adapt, improve, and develop it to suit local conditions and market needs. 
3  Why are country selection criteria needed? 
3.1  Developing focus without losing flexibility 
Before looking at the different global connectedness dimensions and criteria for selecting 
countries for deeper linkages, it is important to consider the merits of compiling this list of 
countries, and to consider the implications of excluding a country from the list.  
It needs to be remembered that New Zealand is a small nation and we are not at the top 
of every other country￿s list for closer links.  In some situations it is also necessary to be 
open to opportunities arising in particular countries that are not on the list, and to keep an 
open mind towards improving linkages with these countries. These considerations mean 
that the list of focus countries should only be seen as a guide, and a means of 
prioritisation. We need to continue to be mindful of all opportunities that may arise. If a 
country does not appear on the list to be the focus of deepened linkages, this in itself is 
not a reason for not considering initiatives to improve linkages with such a country.  
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3.2  Designing a partner selection criteria for deeper 
bilateral economic relationships 
The Government has a role in identifying a set of countries to deepen relationships for 
three reasons.  The first reason is addressing market failure.  Markets do not efficiently 
supply public goods such as basic R&D and generic off-shore investment and trade 
promotion.  The second role of government is ensuring state sector efficiency.  The core 
international business of government, such as trade and immigration policy, must be well 
planned and executed, and be cost effective and provide value for money to the taxpayer. 
The third reason is to ensure that external linkages are maximising opportunities for 
technology transfer and spillovers from the countries that are at the global frontier. 
When a government responds to the challenges of supplying public goods, it must do so 
in an efficient and effective manner.  The marginal benefits and costs of engaging with 
countries will differ between countries.  The government is subject to a budget constraint 
so engagements with countries need to be ranked in terms of their respective payoffs.  
Unfortunately, the data that is available to assist in ranking countries is limited.  This will 
make any ranking subjective, qualitative and prone to honest disagreements.   
Nevertheless, there is merit in determining how to evaluate the relative benefits from 
deeper engagements with various countries using the insights from modern growth 
literature about trade, knowledge creation and transfer, and R&D spillovers. 
The country selection criteria can be used to help screen new policy proposals and 
existing initiatives to ensure they are cost-effective in achieving the objectives of the 
Government￿s Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF
1
).  The GIF sets out what the 
Government believes it and the private sector must do to raise real economic growth.  
Innovation and knowledge are identified as drivers of growth, with the key areas being 
strengthening the innovation framework; growing and developing talent and skills; and 
improving global connectedness.  
The selection criteria and the economic framework that underlies it aim to find policy 
synergies and to act as a robustness tool in the face of uncertainty and incomplete 
information when evaluating the costs and benefits of competing policy proposals.  By 
declaring country priorities well in advance of individual project analysis, agencies can be 
better monitored because initiatives that fall outside the pre-announced regions require 
more justification.  The selection criteria attempt to bring the lessons of experience and 
general trends to policy analysis.  For example, a project with a favourable cost benefit 
analysis in an area where previous policy initiatives have met with repeated later failure 
will be scrutinised more closely than otherwise.  Similarly, a policy proposal for deeper 
links with a country that is not on the list of focus countries warrants more attention.   
Whether an external policy initiative involves a focus country or not should be included in 
the list of significant evidence and arguments for and against the proposal.  
                                                                 
 
1 The web link is http://gif.med.govt.nz/   
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4  Developing country selection criteria 
4.1  The six dimensions of global connectedness 
The criteria for selecting countries for deeper relationships will have six dimensions: R&D, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), closer economic partnerships (CEPs) and other bilateral 
trade links, trade in services, education exports, and people-to-people linkages.  Deeper 
bilateral relationships along these six dimensions should increase New Zealand￿s 
connectedness to the global technological frontier and to our more important export 
markets, and strengthen the innovation system in New Zealand.  
The criteria for R&D, FDI and people-to-people linkages will focus on improving New 
Zealand￿s connections to the countries at the global technological frontier.  Greater 
connectedness to the global technological frontier quickens technology diffusion which 
raises productivity performance directly and strengthens the domestic innovation system. 
Spillovers from deeper R&D, FDI and people linkages may be significant. 
The criteria for trade will focus on opportunities to expand export market access through 
the bilateral liberalisation of trade barriers and promotion campaigns about New Zealand 
exports.  Greater connectedness to the global technological frontier is not the main issue 
in the case of trade.  New Zealand is, of course, embedded in a global system that 
generates mutual interdependence across countries.  As is becoming more and more 
apparent, countries rely on each other for technology transfer, and they learn from each 
other￿s manufacturing methods, modes of organization, marketing, and product design. 
Industrial innovation is concentrated in a relatively few countries and these countries are 
major exporters of capital goods.  This trade in capital goods spreads technological 
advances.  Trade under conditions of low tariffs allows New Zealand firms to import newly 
invented capital and intermediate goods and equipment under liberal conditions. This is 
the passive transfer of technology as discussed in section 2.5. Spillovers may be few. 
The criteria for selecting partners for CEPs and other agreements, and for trade promotion 
campaigns, will build on the distinction between global connectedness and openness. As 
noted above, openness is the absence of barriers, both here and abroad, to the 
international flow of factors of production. Deeper global connectedness requires greater 
actual flows of goods and services. This calls for more attention to markets that are most 
receptive to bilateral trade liberalisation proposals and/or are most suited to trade 
promotion campaigns, including the promotion of tourism and education exports.  
4.2  The partner selection criteria must be dynamic 
Any selection criteria for deepening linkages with other countries must take into account 
the changing circumstances of New Zealand and its external partners.  
To account for the growing importance to international trade of a number of economies in 
the Asia-Pacific region, the selection criteria will identify two groupings of countries. The 
first grouping will be focus countries: countries that are currently major partners of New 
Zealand and are of immediate interest for deeper linkages. The second grouping is 
horizon countries: countries that are likely to grow in importance to New Zealand over the 
next 10 to 20 years as they grow in size in the global economy.  
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4.3  There are strong non-economic reasons for deeper 
bilateral relationships 
The partner selection criteria below will help identify countries of economic importance to 
New Zealand. However, it should be remembered that we might well choose to focus on a 
country for a range of reasons, only one of which is economic.   
Economic linkages do not define the character of our trade and foreign policy interests. 
There are many non-economic reasons why we might want to have strengthening links 
with a country (eg, Canada is a staunch multilateral partner on security and trade issues; 
Chile is a beach-head into Latin America and so is a strategic investment; and France is a 
key participant in the South Pacific). Broader and non-economic justifications for policy 
initiatives are fully acknowledged and should be kept in mind when using the selection 
criteria that are proposed below. Moreover, many of the countries listed below as of 
economic importance to New Zealand will on their own want to build economic linkages 
with New Zealand, often as part of a broader and multi-faceted bilateral relationship. 
5  Applying the country selection criteria 
5.1  Speeding up technology diffusion by deepening R&D 
links with the global leaders 
Stronger R&D links are central to increasing global connectedness. Investment in R&D 
affects a country￿s productivity performance.  The new theories of growth focus on this link 
and have identified channels through which a country￿s productivity performance is 
affected by the R&D efforts of its trading partners.  However, only a few countries are the 
global technological leaders.  Ninety-five per cent of business enterprise R&D in OECD 
statistics is conducted in the G7 countries (OECD 2003).  They are the first to benefit from 
most innovations.  Innovations spread only gradually to others inside a leading edge 
country and abroad.  The USA is the only OECD country that does not import the majority 
of its new technology from abroad (Keller 2002a, 2002b, Eaton and Kortum 1999). 
By deepening our links with leading edge countries with large stocks of knowledge from 
their cumulative R&D efforts, New Zealand may lift its productivity performance. New 
Zealand, of course, has areas of R&D excellence such as in the pastoral sector. In areas 
such as biotechnology, environmental science and certain kinds of information and 
computer technology, New Zealand has carved out a respected R&D niche for itself. 
However, in general, New Zealand is a technological follower. In industries marked by 
progressive innovation, where continually newer varieties and qualities are appearing, the 
advantage of large countries such as the USA and other G7 members with strong R&D 
infrastructures are often too strong for smaller economies to overcome.  It is cheaper to 
copy, imitate or reverse engineer the successes of the global technological leaders.  
At a high level of generality, the internationalisation of technology means that inventions, 
the people generating these inventions, and the ownership of these inventions cross 
national borders more frequently.  Scientists and engineers born in one country graduate 
and get a job in another country, while possibly returning back to their home country after 
a while. Firms located in different countries set up alliances for R&D. Companies can buy 
patents, licences or know-how from foreign firms, they can observe competition (eg, 
reverse engineering), they can hire foreign scientists and engineers, they can interact with  
WP 04/09 |  GLOBAL CONNECTEDNESS AND EXTERNAL BILATERAL 
ECONOMIC LINKAGES ￿ WHICH COUNTRIES? 
10
 
foreign competitors who invested in their country, read the scientific and technological 
literature, or have direct contacts with foreign engineers and scientists at conferences.  
Deciding which countries are to be selected for deeper R&D relationships will depend on 
the extent to which those countries are global R&D leaders. Less than 0.2% of the world￿s 
R&D expenditure occurs in New Zealand (MoRST 2002).  
A common consideration when discussing international technology diffusion and direct 
learning about new technologies invented abroad is the impact of distance. The evidence 
on the extent to which technological progress is local and its rate of geographic diffusion 
is from a relatively young literature and contradictory results are often reported.   
Keller (2002a, 2002b) initially suggested that the extent of technology diffusion fades 
rapidly with distance. Keller found that the geographic half life of spillovers, the distance at 
which half of the spillovers from foreign R&D have disappeared, is only 1,200 km. 
However, if true, it implies that New Zealand (and Australia), with their remote locations 
relative to the G7, benefit little from international technology diffusion. This is implausible. 
A considerable proportion of the cumulative stock of knowledge exists in the form of 
product blueprints and these blueprints should be readily available to New Zealanders. 
Keller (2002a, 2002b) found after further analysis that trade patterns appear to account for 
the majority of all differences in bilateral technology spillovers, whereas foreign direct 
investment and communication flow differences (language differences) account for about 
15% each. Keller found that these three channels account for almost the entire 
localisation effect that was otherwise attributed to geographic distance. Keller (2002a, 
2002b) found that distance is a proxy for trade patterns, FDI and a shared language. 
When these variables are added, distance drops out from Keller￿s econometric analysis.  
The data on technology connectedness suggests that New Zealand￿s R&D sector has well 
developed channels for active diffusion from the global technological frontier. OECD 
(2003) data for 1997-1999 from the European Patent Office (EPO) suggests that 
international co-inventions and cross-border ownership of New Zealand patent 
applications was in the middle of the OECD field and is similar to Australia, Canada and 
the Nordic countries (see table 1).  Another indicator of international R&D collaboration is 
the share of patents with inventors with residences in two or more countries (as in table 
2). New Zealand￿s rate of co-inventions is close to the middle of the OECD field.  The 
number of New Zealand patent applications per million of the population with the EPO is 
about the same as for Australia (see table 2).  The number of New Zealand applications at 
the EPO has tripled since 1991. Australia doubled.  There was a 68% increase in patent 
applications from OECD countries at the EPO from 1991 to 1999 (OECD 2003).  
Using 1993-95 patent applications data at the EPO and at the U.S. Patent Office, Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) found that the degree of technological 
internationalisation is higher for the small OECD countries and that two countries are 
more likely to collaborate if they are close to each other, if they have similar technological 
specialisations, and if they shared a common language. Researchers in larger countries 
find it easier to enter partnerships with colleagues in their own country. However, 
researchers from smaller countries will have fewer local colleagues in their field and must 
look abroad for collaboration (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2001). 
Data collected by the Ministry for Research, Science and Technology (MoRST 2002) 
indicate that the USA, Australia and the UK are New Zealand￿s principal scientific 
collaborators. At any one time, there are about one thousand New Zealand/U.S. 
collaborative research projects that are active, which is about double the number with any  
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other country.  About one third of New Zealand scientists collaborate with UK 
counterparts. The MoRST (2002) data also shows significant New Zealand collaboration 
with German (14%) and to a lesser extent with French scientists (7%).  
Table 1 ￿ Percentage of patents applications with the European Patent Office with 
cross-border ownership, 1997-1999 





































































































































Source: OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Scoreboard 2003 
Strategies that seek to increase R&D collaboration with countries at the global 
technological frontier (the G7) are likely to have a positive impact on New Zealand￿s 
economic performance as most industrial innovations originate in those countries.  New 
Zealand should deepen its R&D links with the global technological leaders that are 
geographically close, that already have extensive trade and FDI links with us, that have 
co-investment potential, that are receptive to collaborations, that share a common 
language, and that share technology specialisations. These criteria are consistent with the 
research of Keller (2002a, 2002b) on the geography of technology diffusion and of Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) on cross-border R&D collaborations.  
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Table 2 ￿ Percentage of patents applications with the European Patent Office with 
foreign co-inventors, 1997- 1999, and patents per million of population 





































































































































Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2003 
New Zealand￿s principal scientific collaborators are the USA, Australia and the UK. The 
USA is identified in MoRST’s (2002) global linkages strategy as a priority bilateral partner.  
Significant R&D collaboration also occurs with Australia. We have extensive trade and FDI 
links with Australia. In addition, there is high level political support from leaders in both 
countries for improved Trans-Tasman R&D links. Australia should be a R&D focus country 
for these reasons even though it is not, in general, a global technology leader.  Although 
distance is a challenge facing collaboration with the UK, New Zealand￿s crown research 
institutes (CRIs), universities and other researchers highly value existing extensive R&D 
links with their British counter-parts. Language works against R&D collaboration with 
Japan, nonetheless it should be a target for deeper R&D links because of its proximity and 
advanced capabilities. A country that warrants mention is Germany. 14% of New Zealand 
scientists already work in collaboration with German counterparts. Germany is the third 
largest global R&D spender (OECD 2003).  
In sum, New Zealand should deepen its R&D connections with four countries at the global 
technological frontier (USA, Japan, UK and Germany) as well as with Australia.  Countries 
that qualify as R&D horizon countries are Korea, Taiwan, and China. All have substantial 
R&D establishments, links to New Zealand, and are geographically close.   
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5.2  Deepening FDI links with the global technological 
leaders 
As shown in figure 1, the stock of in-bound FDI into New Zealand grew steadily between 
1995 and 1998, before levelling off at above NZ$ 60 billion and then reduced to around 
NZ$ 53 billion in 2001, 2002 and 2003. FDI can be motivated by the availability of location 
bound resources or assets; by access to a growing local economy; or by the cost 
advantages from setting up a subsidiary to produce either for local sales or for export. 



















Source: Statistics New Zealand 
Host countries associate FDI with many benefits: a larger capital stock, technology 
transfer, and more competitive markets.  There may be knowledge spillovers if a local firm 
copies the technology used by the foreigner.  Another spillover takes place if competition 
forces local firms to search for new, more efficient technologies.  A transfer of technology 
is possible through the training of local employees, which may spillover as the employees 
move to other firms, or set up their own businesses.  The empirical evidence suggests 
that there are spillovers from FDI.  That is, FDI contributes to productivity and income 
growth in host countries beyond what would be triggered by additional domestic 
investment alone, but that these spillover effects appear to be small (Keller forthcoming).  
This result is not totally surprising.  Multinational firms choose to operate through a fully-
owned subsidiary rather than through joint ventures or technology licensing because FDI 
helps keep private the returns of technology internal to the multinational firm. 
In deciding which countries should be the focus for deeper FDI relationships, the criteria 
are the closeness of the country to the global technological frontier, the size of the 
country, and the rate that technology diffuses from that country to New Zealand as proxied 
by distance and existing trade and FDI links.  The size of the country is a factor because 
the largest OECD countries account for most of global R&D and they are the home of 
most multinational companies (MNCs). It is well known that the R&D of MNCs is 
concentrated in a few home countries, unlike their investment and production activities 
which are spread across the globe.  Since domestic firms are likely to have better 
knowledge and access to domestic markets, a MNC that is entering a new market abroad 
must have some compensating advantages. It seems likely that the MNC will enjoy 
advantages derived from superior management skills and technology, economies of scale, 
and better access to international markets. Multinationals supply a package of needed  
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resources including management experience, entrepreneurial abilities, and technology 
skills which can then be transferred to their local counterparts by means of training 
programmes and the process of learning by doing.  The larger the FDI source country, the 
greater the diversity and specialisation of companies in that country. This greater diversity 
and specialisation increases the chances that a foreign investor will have the expertise to 
identify unnoticed and under-valued projects in New Zealand. This abundance of 
intangible capital in specialised industries in FDI source countries, which generates 
superior expertise in screening investments, enhances FDI flows and makes for a more 
efficient and sophisticated utilisation of capital in New Zealand.  

























1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
As can be seen from figures 2 and 3, most of the inbound-FDI stock in New Zealand 
divides by source between Australia (37%), the UK (14%), the US (11%) and the 
Netherlands (10%). Slightly over a sixth of the stock of inbound FDI is not identified by 
Statistics New Zealand by source-country. Japan, the rest of APEC, and the rest of the 
EU, are all small direct investors into New Zealand.  
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Source: Statistics New Zealand  
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Inbound FDI is highly internationalised by OECD standards (see figure 4). In the 1990s, 
compared to New Zealand, only Belgium and Ireland had a higher stock of inbound-FDI 
as a percentage of GDP. New Zealand￿s FDI stock as a percentage of GDP is nearly 
twice that of Australia and Canada and three times the Nordic countries (see figure 4). 
Figure 4 ￿ Inward FDI positions in OECD countries, 1980s and 1990s 
1. Average values over the two periods. For countries where FDI position data are not available, values of bilateral stocks 
    reported by their OECD partners were summed up to obtain an approximate measure of multilateral FDI stocks.
Source: OECD.









































Figures 2 to 4 suggest that New Zealand is highly internationalised in terms of inbound 
FDI but much of that internationalisation does not involve connecting with the G7.  New 
Zealand is highly connected with Australia in terms of FDI.  Although there are many 
areas of R&D excellence in Australia, New Zealand should look to deepen its FDI 
relationships with source countries that are closer to the global technological frontier. 
The obvious first choice for a deeper FDI relationship is the USA. The USA is at the 
leading edge of the global technological frontier and is a major trading partner and foreign 
investor. Another candidate for a deeper FDI relationship is the UK. The UK is a 
significant trade and FDI partner of New Zealand (see figures 2 and 3). Distance might 
count against FDI from the UK but the extensive and long-standing trade and FDI 
relationship offsets this disadvantage.  Japan is another country that should be 
considered. Japan is a major trading partner but Japanese FDI into New Zealand is low 
(see figures 2 and 3). Language is a barrier to technological diffusion from Japan via FDI 
but on the other hand, Japan is much closer to New Zealand in terms of distance than are 
the members of the European Union. Japan accounts for a major share of global R&D and 
it is a large source country for outward-bound FDI and MNCs. The final country that 
should be a focus for a deeper FDI relationship is Australia. Australia does not rate as 
highly as the G7 countries as a source of technology. On the other hand, Australia is New 
Zealand￿s largest trading and FDI partner. Those links should be consolidated. 
The countries that should be horizon countries for FDI linkages are Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Korea and China. Singapore and Hong Kong are major global financial 
centres. All five countries currently have moderately sized FDI in New Zealand. However, 
over the next 10 to 20 years, all five of these countries will grow in importance in the  
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global economy as major sources of outward FDI.  New Zealand will need to deepen its 
FDI links and promotional efforts with these five horizon countries￿these five major new 
global sources of FDI and MNC expertise￿over the same time frame. 
5.3  Developing criteria for selecting CEP partners￿some 
are better than others 
CEPs are an opportunity to remove tariff barriers on a bilateral basis and to deepen 
economic integration across the wider trade and investment relationship.   
Selecting candidates for CEPs is complicated.  A CEP raises welfare if it creates trade by 
allowing cheaper products from partners to substitute for more expensive domestic 
production.  This is trade creation.  CEPs can divert trade by allowing firms in partner 
countries to displace imported goods from outside the bloc that were cheaper when both 
faced equal tariffs.  This is trade diversion.  The tariff advantage over third countries 
allows high-cost firms in partner countries to win sales.  While trade creation contributes 
positively to welfare in the home country, trade diversion results in a welfare loss.  
The balance between trade creation and trade diversion is the key determinant of the 
benefits of a CEP and who is and is not a good potential partner.  Trade diversion offsets 
trade creation because CEP members start to import goods from each other that they 
could have imported at lower cost from other countries in the absence of a preferential 
tariff.  Little is gained if consumers pay much the same prices as before the CEP and tariff 
revenues are lost to make way for higher-cost imports from a partner country.   
The welfare effects of CEPs vary from deal to deal: members split the gains from higher 
export prices but incur higher import prices. In those deals where there is trade diversion, 
a member pays more for imports, with the increase financed by what had previously 
accrued as tariff revenues. New Zealand collected $285 million in customs duty in the 
year to 30 June 2003, with $155 million in duty on textile, clothing and footwear imports. A 
poor choice of partner could lose millions in duty with few retail price benefits. 
Studies of individual free trade agreements have produced a wide range of results. The 
previous empirical literature, as reviewed Schiff and Waters (2003) and Adams et al 
(2003) suggests that the nine CEPs studied (including CER) are modestly trade diverting, 
which is a relatively benign result. However, new empirical work undertaken by the 
Australian Productivity Commission (Adams et al 2003) suggests that of the 18 recent 
preferential trading agreements examined in detail, 12 have diverted more trade from non-
members than they have created among members. What is more, some of the apparently 
quite liberal agreements￿including EU, NAFTA, CER and MERCOSUR￿have failed to 
create significant additional trade among members (relative to the average trade changes 
registered among countries in the sample).  Overall, the empirical literature suggests that 
there is weak evidence that trade is smaller than it otherwise might have been in at least 
some of the blocs researched. However, the picture is sufficiently mixed that it is not 
possible to conclude that trade diversion has been a major problem.  
In the early 1990s, analytical attention turned to the notion that free trade agreements 
(FTAs) should be formed between natural trading partners. Natural trading partners are 
countries which already trade a lot with each other. As most of the proposed partner￿s 
trade is already with each other, there is little additional trade to divert.  A close variant of 
the ￿natural trading partner￿ hypothesis is that FTAs are more likely to be beneficial when 
they are among geographic neighbours because transport costs will be lower.   
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The natural trading partners criterion for CEP partners has been criticised. The welfare 
effects of FTAs depend on the volumes of trade actually diverted, which need not be 
proportional to initial trade shares. That a trade flow is already large says nothing about 
the need to stimulate it. Some flows are large because of existing distortions and may 
need to be curtailed rather than boosted. Importantly, the larger the initial volume of trade, 
the larger the amount of tariff revenue that is to be foregone under a CEP. 























































Source: Statistics New Zealand 
The practical value of proximity and volume of trade as CEP partner selection criteria may 
be restricted.  Many countries have diversified trade and trade extensively with far away 
countries.  Australia, our CER partner, only accounts for slightly more than one fifth of 
New Zealand￿s trade (see figures 5 and 6). After that, the EU big 4, the USA and Japan 
account for 10 to 15% each of imports and exports (see figures 5 and 6). After these few 
countries, (see figures 5 and 6), New Zealand￿s trading partners are a long tail.   


























































Source: Statistics New Zealand  
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Fortunately, trade diversion is a minor policy risk because 95% of imports by value land 
duty free. Customs collected $285 million in duty in the year to June 03, with $155 million 
of that duty collected from textile, clothing, and footwear (TCF) imports.  That is not to say 
that there are no risks.  A poor choice of partner, a partner with a high-cost TCF export 
expansion capability could forego significant amounts of customs duty.  
With 95% of imports landing duty free into New Zealand, a CEP partner selection criterion 
based on proximity (with the TCF caveat) reasserts itself. Scollay (2003) has suggested 
that small and medium sized economies gain substantially from CEPs with large 
economies. This suggests that more CEPs along the Asia-Pacific Rim would take 
advantage of inherent cost advantages related to proximity. Other factors that should be 
taken into account are the export growth prospects of given markets, market size, the 
receptiveness of countries to trade liberalisation offers and comparative advantage.  
An advantage of concentrating on the Pacific-Rim (USA, Japan, Australia and China) is 
that larger CEP partners are more likely to satisfy New Zealand￿s import demand without 
increasing their export prices. These countries have such large domestic markets that 
they are less likely to stop importing goods from the rest of the world that compete with 
New Zealand￿s exports and thus reduce their internal price of these goods below the world 
price plus their tariff on the third country imports. The price on New Zealand exports may 
continue to be the world price plus the tariff on third country imports.  
As a small country exporting to large markets, preferential access would allow New 
Zealand exporters to win market share and raise export prices without depressing the 
consumer price in that export market, which is the world price plus the tariff. Modelling of 
the gains from a trade agreement with the USA assumes that U.S. prices will change little 
after a trade agreement so New Zealand exporters will gain market share and sell at a 
price that is higher than before the agreement. That price need only match the prices of 
competitors outside the trade agreement, who will be charging the world price plus the 
tariff. New Zealand exporters receive that price too, but have the advantage of not having 
to pay any tariff. The free trade agreement brings New Zealand exporters inside the tariff 
wall of the partner country and allows them to share in the price premiums of that tariff 
wall that are usually enjoyed by the import-competing industries in the partner country.  
The horizon countries for deeper trade linkages would be South Korea and the ASEAN 
countries (particularly Thailand and Malaysia), and Mexico. New Zealand is currently 
undertaking joint studies of the possibility of a CEP with Thailand and with China.  Closer 
economic partnerships with Mexico and with Chile have been discussed.  
5.4  Deepening relationships short of CEPs 
CEPs are not the only form of agreements through which New Zealand can seek to 
deepen trade links with focus countries. Trade and investment framework agreements and 
trade facilitation protocols can address non-tariff impediments. 
Deeper economic relationships can also cover unilateral initiatives such as increased 
promotion of exports (including tourism and educational services). The Brand New 
Zealand programme is an example of efforts to increase global connectedness that can 
be used to deepen relationships with the focus countries by unilateral means. A number of 
government programmes support businesses building international networks.  World 
Class New Zealanders, run by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), provides 
opportunities for high potential New Zealand businesses to learn from top offshore 
businesses, improve their business capabilities and establish networks of overseas  
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experts and strategic partners.  NZTE has sponsored the Kiwi Expatriates Abroad (KEA) 
network, under which talented New Zealanders living overseas help New Zealand 
businesses establish a presence in offshore markets and share their knowledge. 
5.5  Promoting the services trade 
Service exports and imports have evolved significantly over recent years. Between 1999 
and 2003, New Zealand moved from being a net importer of services to being a net 
exporter, with a surplus of over $1 billion in the year to March 2003 (see figure 7).   



















Source: Statistics New Zealand 
The reasons for the switch from a deficit to a surplus are the sharp increases in tourism 
receipts and education exports. Tourism has gone up by 50% in value while education 
exports almost tripled in value (see figures 8 and 9). 






















Source: Statistics New Zealand  
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Education exports aside, the bulk of the service trade is transport, business travel, and 
tourism (see figure 10). Royalties and licence fees aside, transport and tourism and the 
rest of the services trade are not major gateways for technology. Chance encounters 
where tourists visit New Zealand and return as immigrants or as investors do happen but 
there is no data on whether these connections are major sources of new external links.  


















Source: Statistics New Zealand 
The growth in the number of tourists (and of students) coming to New Zealand can be 
best explained by: the strength of the source-country economies; and the strength of the 
source-country currencies. The regions that continue to offer the strongest growth 
prospects are the Asia-Pacific and South Asia (World Bank 2003). The East Asia 
economies are expected by the World Bank (2003) to grow at twice the pace of the high-
income countries in the next few years.  





























Source: Statistics New Zealand  
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The focus countries for tourism should be markets with major growth potential, those 
markets that are short- to medium hauls and/or are markets that are familiar with New 
Zealand as a holiday destination. These tourist markets are Australia, USA, UK, Japan, 
Korea, and China. The UK and the USA are long-haul markets but they are markets well 
familiar with New Zealand and send many tourists to New Zealand (see figure 11).  
The horizon markets for tourism would be the ASEAN countries due to their growth 
potential, proximity, and rising incomes.  
Figure 11 ￿ International visitors by market, New Zealand, July 2002 ￿ June 2003 


















Source: Statistics New Zealand 
The focus on Asia for tourism is important because the World Tourism Organisation￿s 
(2003) projected growth in global tourist arrivals from East Asia is 8.2% for 2000-2010, 
which is notably higher than the global average growth forecast of 4.5%. The Tourism 
Research Council New Zealand (2003) also forecasts Asia to be New Zealand￿s strongest 
growth markets for tourism arrivals in the decade to 2010.  
For New Zealand￿s education exports, the focus should be North and East Asia. The aim 
should be to deepen relationships with the major markets of China and Japan while 
diversifying into the smaller markets to mitigate single-market risk. For example, in 
2000/01, no more than 11 to 18% of foreign fee-paying students in Australia, Canada and 
the USA came from any one country. Comparatively, in New Zealand, 30% of students 
came from Japan in 2000. By 2002, the largest single education export market had 
changed and nearly 40% of students came from China.  
Market size and growth potential identify China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN 
countries as the focus countries for education exports. Given the high current exposure to 
China and Japan, there is a need to diversify by increasing efforts to attract students from 
Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Indonesia. 
India and Pakistan would be the horizon countries. India is a close call and it could be 
classified as a focus country. This is because India and China and are the two major 
emerging markets for education exports. As an additional complication, growth in 
education exports to India and Pakistan are full of twists and turns because of immigration 
over-stay risks and difficulties in verifying documentation.  
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5.6  Increased people-to-people linkages 
People-to-people links bring access to knowledge of preferences in offshore export 
markets, to technological developments, to the latest ideas and thinking and to a larger 
pool of skilled labour. Deeper international people-to-people links can further lift the 
growth rate of the economy by increasing the average amount of human capital in the 
work-force and by increasing the stock of offshore knowledge that New Zealanders can 
access and exploit. Not all new technology diffuses in the form of written blueprints for 
new products. There is a role for direct learning and the human capital that is embodied in 
each worker and researcher. This raises the possibility that more interactions between 
New Zealand and overseas ideas workers could benefit domestic productivity rates. 
Some new inventions spread quickly across borders.  Others are more localised and are 
held closely by specific individuals and companies.  For example, in biotechnology, an 
industry based almost exclusively on new knowledge and cutting edge scientific 
discoveries, firms tend to cluster together in just a handful of locations.  Clustering is often 
due to the location of star scientists: those individuals with high amounts of human capital 
who are able to appropriate their knowledge thorough start-up firms (Audretsch and 
Feldman 1996).  The importance of proximity is shaped by the role played by the scientist. 
The scientist is more likely to be located in the same region as the firm when the 
relationship involves the transfer of new economic knowledge or some other specialised 
input.  When the scientist is providing a service that does not involve knowledge transfer 
or a specialised input associated with the human capital of specific individuals and 
groups, proximity and star scientists are less important (Audretsch and Feldman 1996). 
A direct way of linking star foreign talent with New Zealand opportunities is short- and 
long-term immigration.  Labour mobility is an important source of knowledge diffusion. 
One survey of the founders of companies on a 1989 list of the 100 fastest growing 
companies in the U.S. found that 71% of them replicated or modified an idea encountered 
through previous employment (see Bhide 1994).  A study of patent data from the U.S. 
semiconductor industry by Almeida and Kogut (1999) found that ideas are spread through 
the mobility of key engineers.  Song, Almeida and Wu (2001) used patent data to find that 
engineers who moved from the USA to South Korea or Taiwan built their subsequent 
innovations upon knowledge from their previous firms in the USA.  
Direct learning across borders has a long history as the foundation for new industries and 
products. The U.S. textile industry in the 19
th century and the Japanese automobile 
industry in the 20
th century were both established after sending study missions abroad. 
The missions that Japan sent to the West after the Meiji restoration is a classic example of 
the potential of face-to-face learning. After World War II, the Marshall plan sponsored 
20,000 people from Europe to visit the USA to learn the latest ideas. 
New Zealand firms can hire foreign scientists and engineers. New Zealanders can interact 
with foreign competitors who invested here, read the scientific and technological literature, 
or have direct contacts with foreign engineers and other researchers in conferences or 
fairs and through joint ventures. Import-competing companies can acquire technology by 
R&D collaboration, reading patents and licenses; analysing competing products for 
reverse engineering and imitation; consultation with experts; communications with 
suppliers; mergers and joint ventures/alliances. Exporters can obtain new technology 
through R&D out-sourcing, analysing competing products, purchasing equipment, 
contacts with customers, joint ventures/alliances, and personnel exchanges.  
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The impact that new foreign knowledge has on New Zealand￿s productivity depends on 
having the capacity to digest such knowledge, and to make efficient use of it.  This calls 
for sufficient technological capacity, human capital and R&D facilities to capitalise on the 
off-shore innovations.  Countries may differ in their ability to absorb imported technologies 
even if the new knowledge is global and free.  Barriers to diffusion and adaptation include 
regulation and taxes (Eaton and Kortum 1999, Jones 1994, Parente and Prescott 1994, 
1999) and insufficient domestic human capital to absorb quickly the imported technology 
(Caselli and Coleman 2001, Caselli and Wilson 2003). 
The rate at which the gap between the global technology frontier and the present level of 
productivity in New Zealand is closed depends heavily on the current level of human 
capital.  More highly skilled workers are likely to learn new technologies faster than less 
skilled workers.  Consequently, a New Zealand with a more skilled and globally connected 
labour force is likely to grow faster than an economy with a less skilled and less 
internationally connected labour force.  Thus, the performance of the economy depends 
not only upon the size and growth of the labour pool in New Zealand, but also upon the 
level of skills possessed by and international connectedness of the members of that 
labour pool.  The productivity of a worker with a given amount of human capital depends 
upon the human capital of other workers he or she interacts with (Lucas 2002).  
As discussed in section 2.4, one strand of the new growth theories proposes that 
productivity gains come from investments in R&D with research labs producing blueprints 
of new products.  Another strand of the new growth theories suspects that the relationship 
between new technology and economic growth is more indirect with human capital as the 
key.  Economic growth and technological diffusion are much more than the turning 
discoveries into commercial blueprints.  An important share of advances in knowledge 
may come from learning-by-doing (Lucas 1993).  This may lead to delays between the 
appearance of a new technology and its peak usage (or full diffusion) in New Zealand. 
The leaning-by-doing and on-the-job accumulation of human capital must be repeated. 
A different literature has emphasised the impact of networks and social capital found in a 
region or country (Agrawal, Cockburn and McHale 2002, Rauch 1999, 2003).  Relational 
networks exist at multiple levels and they can link individuals, groups, firms, industries, 
regions, and countries.  These relational networks create the face-to-face and work-place 
contact that facilitates the leaning-by-doing and on-the-job training prized by new growth 
theory.  Human capital formation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a way 
that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital.  We learn from each other 
in acquiring a skill￿each member of a group raises not just his own productivity but also 
the skill level and average productivity of the whole group.  For example, research 
laboratories and facilities of New Zealand universities and their pool of foreign students 
and researchers and off-shore links and networks are sources of innovation-generating 
knowledge that are available to local private enterprise for commercial exploitation.  
Research at universities provides a link that facilitates knowledge spillovers in the form of 
recruiting international talent to New Zealand, transferring technology through local and 
international linkages and interactions, placing students in industry, and providing a 
platform for firms and researchers to interact.  Crown research institutes can also perform 
the hub and linking functions for research similar to those just described for universities. 
The mid-field ranking of New Zealand patent applications among OECD members at the 
European Patent Office that are international co-inventions or have cross-border 
ownership suggests New Zealand has good international R&D links (see tables 1 and 2).   
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5.7  Migration and trade 
The ties that immigrants have to their home countries can play a role in fostering trade. 
Immigrant ties include knowledge of home-country markets, language, preferences, and 
business contacts that have the potential to decrease the transaction costs of trade. 
Migrants may also prefer products from their home countries, which implies more imports. 
The empirical studies to date almost exclusively point to a positive impact of immigration 
on trade between the immigrants’ host and home countries (see Law and Bryant 
forthcoming).  A study of ethnic Chinese networks, as proxied by their population shares, 
found that these networks increased bilateral trade both within Southeast Asia and for 
other countries (see Rauch and Trindale 2002). Where ethnic Chinese communities are 
relatively large fractions of a country’s population and have relatively numerous direct 
connections across international borders, Rauch and Trindale found that they facilitate 
trade by helping to match international buyers and sellers. Where ethnic Chinese 
communities are small fractions of their countries’ populations, and they are close-knit, 
they facilitate trade by enforcing community sanctions that deter opportunistic behaviour.  
Research being undertaken by Law and Bryant (forthcoming 2004) using New Zealand 
data indicates that there is a link between immigration and trade.  The results of the data 
analysis concern the relationship between migrant stocks in New Zealand and New 
Zealand￿s trade.  As table 3 shows, there has been very little change in migrant stocks 
from traditional sources, such as the UK, Australia, and Europe, but there have been large 
changes in migrant stocks from other sources such as Asia and the Pacific.  
Table 3 ￿ Census data on the place of birth of the New Zealand population 
Place  of  birth  1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
New  Zealand  2,679,054 2,759,178 2,812,035 2,848,206 2,890,869 
East Asia & Pacific  75,819  97,617  147,663  197,775  252,759 
United  Kingdom  252,816 248,130 231,726 222,726 217,380 
Unspecified / Undefined  13,491  21,849  35,067  165,474  148,137 
Europe & Central Asia  47,772  55,527  55,806  63,207  67,983 
Australia  43,809 47,208 48,636 54,570 56,142 
Sub ￿ Saharan Africa  7,527  7,734  9,195  17,409  36,234 
South  Asia  7,440  8,040 12,573 19,287 30,690 
North  America  11,769 13,935 15,297 19,218 21,279 
Middle East & North Africa  1,515  1,851  3,348  7,191  11,805 
Latin  America  &  Caribbean  2,295 2,214 2,583 3,237 3,999 
Total  3,143,307 3,263,283 3,373,929 3,618,300 3,737,277 
Foreign-born as % of total*  14.4%  14.9%  15.8%  17.5%  19.5% 
* These calculations deduct ￿unspecified / undefined￿ from the total.  This assumes that the proportion of ￿unspecified / undefined￿ 
people who are foreign-born is the same as that of the rest of the population. 
Source: Law and Bryant (forthcoming 2004). 
Foreign born as a proportion of the New Zealand population have risen by a third in the 20 
years to the 2001 (see table 3). In addition, the number of countries from which New 
Zealand has received significant migration has risen by several-fold (see table 4).    
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Table 4 ￿ Increasing diversity of the migrant stock 
Number of countries from which New 
Zealand has at least￿ 
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
10  migrants  150 136 142 163 177 
100  migrants  86 85 90  109  121 
1,000  migrants  28 33 36 46 48 
10,000  migrants  5 5 7  15  16 
Note ￿ ￿Migrant￿ here means foreign born. 
Source: Law and Bryant (forthcoming 2004). 
The percentage of the New Zealand population that is foreign-born (19.5%) is high by 
international standards (see table 5). Australia, Luxembourg and Switzerland are the only 
countries in table 5 with a higher percentage of foreign-born. Many OECD countries have 
foreign-born percentages well below 10%.   
Tables 3-5 together suggest that, at least in terms of migration flows, New Zealand is 
already unusually well connected globally at the people-to-people level.  
Table 5 ￿ Foreign born as a percentage of population, selected countries 
Country  Percent foreign born  Year   
Luxembourg 30.2  1991     
Australia 23.1  2001     
Switzerland 20.5  2000     
New Zealand  19.5  2001   
Canada 18.4  2001     
Singapore 18.3  2001     
Sweden 11.3  2000     
United States  11.1  2000    
Austria 10.4  2000     
Ireland 10.4  2002     
France 10.0  1990     
Netherlands 9.3  2001     
Germany 8.9  2000  * 
Slovenia 8.5  2002     
Belgium 8.4  2000  * 
United Kingdom  8.3  2001    
Norway 7.3  2001     
Denmark 5.8  2000     
Spain 5.4  2001     
Hungary 2.9  2000     
Finland 2.6  2000     
Italy 2.4  2000  * 
South Africa  2.3  2001    
Portugal 2.2  2001     
Czech Rep.  2.0  2000  * 
Japan 1.2  1997  * 
Slovak Rep.  0.5  2000  * 
* Foreign citizenship rather than foreign-born 
Source: Law and Bryant (forthcoming 2004).  
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Analysis by Law and Bryant (forthcoming 2004) suggests that immigration increases New 
Zealand￿s trade. Specifically, a 1% increase in migrants from a given country leads to an 
approximately 0.2% increase in both imports and exports.  These results for immigration 
and New Zealand trade are broadly in line with those of previous studies in other 
countries. The data is still being analysed, as is whether these linkages between 
immigration and export flows exist for all countries or for all export sectors.  
Given the targeting of the Pacific-Rim countries for FDI, trade, services and R&D, those 
countries also should be targeted for greater people linkages. The UK also should be 
targeted so as to lever off existing strong relationships in all dimensions. The horizon 
countries for people linkages including immigration would be India and Pakistan. South 
Asia has a growing and well-educated middle class and fluency in English is common.  
5.8  The Kiwi diaspora 
Another people-to-people link is New Zealanders living aboard. These Diaspora ties may 
increase knowledge of markets, languages, preferences, and build business contacts that 
all have the potential to decrease trading costs.  New Zealanders living abroad may prefer 
products from their home country, which implies that more trade. However, research being 
undertaken by Treasury is suggesting that Kiwi Diaspora links may be overstated.  
Table 6 ￿ Census data on New Zealander-born and Australian-born populations 
Country Date  NZ-born  in 
country 









New Zealand  2001  2,890,869  86.66%  56,142  0.40% 
Australia 2000  355,765  10.66%  13,629,685  98.25% 
England and Wales  2001  54,425  1.63%  98,772  0.71% 
United States  2000  22,872  0.69%  60,965  0.44% 
Canada 2001  9475  0.28%  18,910  0.14% 
Republic of Ireland  2002  2,195  0.07%  5,947  0.04% 
Northern Ireland  2001  448  0.01%  1,544  0.01% 
Total identified New Zealanders 
or Australians 
 3,336,049  100.00%  13,871,965  100.00% 
Source: Law and Bryant (forthcoming 2004). 
Table 6 is based on census data from 7 countries. The data in table 6 concerns the 
birthplaces of usual residents of the 7 countries. The table shows, approximately, the 
global distribution of the New Zealand-born and Australian-born populations. It is only 
approximate because the table only covers some of the countries in which New 
Zealanders and Australians live (though they are probably the main countries.)  
The main conclusion from table 6 seems to be that around 15% of the global New 
Zealand-born population lives outside New Zealand. Of these, over three-quarters live in 
Australia. The proportion of the Australian population that lives overseas is much smaller 
by comparison.  The Diaspora is less geographically diversified than is sometimes 
assumed. Expectations about the opportunities the New Zealand Diaspora may offer as 
trade, investment and technology links may need to be tempered. The opportunities that 
the New Zealand Diaspora offer to their homeland as trade and technology links may be 
beneficial but should not be overstated.  
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6  Summary and next steps 
This paper investigated whether there are a key set of countries with which New Zealand 
should be seeking to form deeper bilateral economic relationships. The paper used the 
insights of the new theories of economic growth to develop criteria for selecting countries 
as potential partners for deeper economic linkages across six global connectedness 
dimensions: FDI, R&D links, trade in goods, inbound tourism, education exports and 
people-to-people linkages. The new theories of economic growth provide many new ways 
to think about economic growth and international integration and a more diverse set of 
mechanisms for analysing the role of government policy and off-shore linkages. 
We identified a core of countries along the Asia-Pacific Rim (as well as the UK) with which 
New Zealand should deepen its relations (see table 7) both as a focus over the next five 
years and further towards the horizon￿in 10 to 20 years time.  
Table 7 ￿ Focus and horizon countries 
Factor of 
production or 
output demand:  
Connectedness 
dimension 
Criteria ￿ summary  Focus countries  Horizon Countries 
Capital FDI 
 
Source of technology 
Size of capital markets 




Japan and UK 
Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, South 




Highly skilled people 
 
Global R&D leaders  
Existing linkages 
Proximity 








Japan, UK and 
Germany 
Taiwan, Korea, China 
Trade in goods 
and services 





Future growth prospects 
Distance and market size 
Receptiveness to CEP 




Trade diversion risks 
 
Australia, USA,  
Japan and China 
 
 




 In-bound  tourism 
 
Market size, distance & 
familiarity 
Australia, USA, 




 Education  exports 
 
Current and projected 
demand 





India, Pakistan  
Labour:   People linkages: 
Face-to-face contact, 
Migration flows, work 
and student visas 
Language, skills.  
Means of complementing 
access in the other 
dimensions 




The focus countries for FDI are the USA, Japan, the UK and Australia. The focus 
countries for R&D are the four countries just mentioned and Germany.  The proposed  
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criteria for selecting partners for CEPs and for expanding the services trade focus on our 
nearer markets, which are along the Asia-Pacific Rim (as well as the UK for tourism). The 
horizon countries are located along the Asia-Pacific Rim and South Asia (see table 7).  
An interesting and reassuring result from considering the countries that flow from the 
criteria is that many of the same countries keep appearing. Japan is a focus country for all 
six dimensions. The USA and Australia appear five times in the table. The UK and China 
appear four times in the table. A range of steps can be taken to deepen relationships with 
a focus and horizon countries. Some countries are candidates for CEPs. All could be the 
target of trade and investment promotion. 
A key question is whether external policies will be mutually supportive so as to capture the 
synergies between flows of different factors.  For New Zealand to become truly globally 
connected, policy initiatives need to be coordinated. The same core of countries appears 
in most criteria, which should facilitate synergies. 
The practical policy implication is that when budget and other external initiatives come 
before Ministers, such initiatives should be seen through a lens that places a greater 
confidence in proposals for deeper relationships with the Asia-Pacific Rim countries or the 
UK and more scrutiny of proposals that emphasise other regions.   
We are not saying that opportunities should be passed up because they are outside the 
Pacific-Rim.  We are saying is that such proposals should be examined more closely. 
After this scrutiny, each proposal will have a clear intervention logic linking the individual 
global connectedness initiative and the package as a whole to improved productivity. It 
should be added that links do not solely define the character of our trade and foreign 
policy interests. These broader and non-economic justifications for external initiatives are 
fully acknowledged and should be kept in mind when using the proposed criteria.   
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Economic Development, Research, Science and Technology, Education and Agriculture 
and Forestry are among the agencies updating their international connectedness 
strategies. Their conclusions about countries to target for deeper relations are similar to 
those in this paper. The agencies just mentioned will have lead responsibility in ensuring 
that external linkages have the country and regional focus that is advocated in this paper.  
The Treasury will have a role in implementing the country focus advocated in this paper. 
However, Treasury has responsibility for first opinion advice in a limited number of areas 
arising from its role as economic and fiscal advisor to the Government. The Treasury￿s 
opportunities to influence the external focus of other agencies will arise mainly through 
providing second opinion advice on the outputs of agencies, through the 
vote/monitoring/budget co-ordination role, and through participation in whole of 
government processes/reviews￿such as the GIF steering group and the immigration 
review.  
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